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ABSTRACT
This paper provides evidence that market conditions matter for organization design by studying how
trade policy affects vertical integration. We embed an incomplete-contract model of firm boundaries
into an international trade framework. Integration decisions are driven by a tradeoff between managers’
pecuniary benefits of coordinating production and their private benefits of operating in preferred ways.
Integration generates more output than non-integration, but imposes a cost on managers by forcing
them to accommodate to common procedures. A key implication is that higher product prices result
in more integration. Since trade policy affects prices, it influences organizational decisions: higher
tariffs lead to more integration; moreover, ownership structures are more alike across countries with
similar levels of protection. To assess the evidence, we construct firm-level indices of vertical integration
for a large set of countries from a unique dataset. Our empirical analysis, which exploits both cross-section



















What determines ﬁrm boundaries? When are inputs produced in house rather than being sourced
from independent market suppliers? Answering these questions has been a fundamental concern
of organization economics since Coase’s (1937)’s seminal paper. Over the past two decades, the
theory of the ﬁrm has stressed contractual incompleteness as the key to understanding vertical
integration decisions. Property rights over assets, which deﬁne ﬁrm boundaries, and allocations
of control over production decisions within and across those boundaries are central elements of
organizational design. They are chosen to mediate how a ﬁrm’s stakeholders trade oﬀ collective
goals and their private interests.1
Recent theoretical work has examined how ﬁrms’ boundary choices are aﬀected by market
conditions. In particular, market thickness, demand elasticities, and terms of trade in supplier
markets can have a crucial impact of ﬁrms’ vertical integration decisions (e.g., McLaren, 2000;
Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Legros and Newman, 2008).2 So far, evidence on the importance
of these factors is sparse. In this paper, we exploit variation in the degree of trade protection
faced by ﬁrms to show that market conditions — in particular the level of product prices — do
matter for vertical integration decisions.
We adopt a simple model of ﬁrm boundaries, inspired by Hart and Holmstr¨ om (2010), in
which managers of diﬀerent production units trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of coordinating production
decisions against the cost of accommodating to common ways of doing things. A feature of this
model is that vertical integration generates more output than non-integration, but imposes a
ﬁxed cost on managers, who lose the ability to operate in their preferred ways. The price of
output is then a crucial determinant of ﬁrms’ boundary decisions. Speciﬁcally, the higher the
market price, the more integrated ﬁrms will be.3
The reason for this result is that the primary decision makers — the managers — have not
only a stake in the organizational goal, but also derive private, noncontractible beneﬁts from
1The formal incomplete contracts approach begins with Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990), which emphasize the hold-up problem. In these papers, ﬁrm boundaries are identiﬁed with the extent of
decision rights over assets and associated operations. Hart (1995) provides a summary and discussion of earlier
as well as more modern approaches to the study of ﬁrm boundaries.
2A related literature examines whether goods are sold within or across ﬁrm boundaries in the global economy,
focusing mostly on the importance of contract enforcement and relationship-speciﬁc investments. See, for exam-
ple, Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004), Nunn (2007), and Nunn and Treﬂer (2008). There is also some
work on within-ﬁrm delegation decisions in the international context (e.g., Marin and Verdier, 2008; Guadalupe
and Wulf, 2010; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2010).
3The eﬀect of prices on managerial conﬂicts and ownership decisions was ﬁrst explored by Legros and Newman
(2009). As stressed by Hart and Holmstr¨ om (2010), production units can come into conﬂict about the way of
doing things for diﬀerent reasons. For example, employees’ human capital is often tied to particular technologies,
with which they are familiar and like to work. Also, future career prospects may depend on how well human
capital ﬁts ﬁrms’ needs, so strategic choices concerning technology will have signiﬁcant private consequences.
Diﬀerences in ways of operating (e.g., engineers and marketing departments) can make coordination diﬃcult. In
a similar vein, Van den Steen (2005) stresses the importance to organization design of conﬂicting private beneﬁts
that stem from diﬀerent corporate cultures or managerial visions.
1the organization. When diﬀerent parts of the organization are not integrated, managers make
decisions independently, taking more into account their private beneﬁts, and this results in poor
coordination and low output. Integration puts decisions in the hands of a single headquarters
with strong incentives to coordinate, so as to maximize beneﬁts to the organization. Non-
integration is thus associated with high private beneﬁts and low coordination, integration with
high coordination and high private costs. Market price enters the tradeoﬀ because it directly
aﬀects the organization’s proﬁt objective but has a negligible impact on managers’ private costs.
When market price is high, the tradeoﬀ is resolved in favor of integration, since the organizational
goal is relatively more valuable than private goals. At low prices, the tradeoﬀ goes the other
way, in favor of non-integration.
The straightforward empirical strategy to verify whether product prices and the degree of
vertical integration are positively correlated, as suggested by this organizational theory, would be
to regress some measure of vertical integration on industry prices. The main diﬃculty with this
approach is that it would not allow us to clearly distinguish the organizational model we have out-
lined, in which higher prices lead to more integration, from models that predict the same positive
correlation, but with causality going the opposite way. According to these “market-foreclosure”
theories, in imperfectly competitive industries, ﬁrms may integrate with their suppliers to re-
duce competition with their rivals, thus pushing product prices higher.4 Testing whether product
prices aﬀect organization design thus requires an exogenous source of price variation. In this
respect, trade policy provides an ideal proving ground: the degree of trade protection obviously
aﬀects equilibrium prices, but is unlikely to be aﬀected by ﬁrms’ boundary choices.
To guide our empirical analysis, we embed the incomplete contracts model of vertical in-
tegration described above into a standard perfectly-competitive international trade framework,
introducing tariﬀs into a multi-country version of the framework developed in Conconi, Legros
and Newman (2011). The main prediction of our model is that ﬁrms’ ownership decisions should
depend on the level of protection they face. In particular, the higher are import tariﬀs on the ﬁnal
good produced in an industry, the more integrated ﬁrms in that industry should be.5 Moreover,
if two countries’ tariﬀs in the same industry are close, equilibrium prices and ownership struc-
tures should be similar. Analogously, if two countries are members of a regional trade agreement,
all else equal, enterprises in those two economies should have similar organizational structures.
That is, convergence in corporate organization — the tendency of industries to be characterized
by the same ownership structure across countries — may result not only from global cultural
transmission or technological diﬀusion, but also from standard neoclassical source, the law of
one price.
Absence of an international dataset suﬃciently comprehensive to support studies of ﬁrm
4See Salinger (1988) for an early contribution and Rey and Tirole (2007) for a survey.
5This can be interpreted as a statement about intensive margins — more parts of the supply chain should be
part of a single ﬁrm as the price for the ﬁnal good increases, or about extensive margins — a greater fraction of
ﬁrms are integrated at higher prices, assuming some heterogeneity among them.
2organization across a wide range of countries has limited empirical analysis of the eﬀects of
trade policy on organizational choices. We overcome this limitation by using a new dataset from
Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) that contains both listed and unlisted plant-level observations for a
large set of countries and territories in 2004. For each plant, the dataset includes information
about its primary and secondary activities, as well as about ownership (e.g., its domestic or
global parent). By combining this information with U.S. input-output tables, we are able to
construct ﬁrm-level vertical integration indices that measure the fraction of inputs used in the
production of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnal good that can be produced in house.6 This methodology enables
us to analyze ﬁrms’ ownership structures in a large set of countries and industries, and thus to
overcome an important constraint in the literature.
One strategy to examine the organizational eﬀects of trade policy is to exploit cross-country
and cross-sectoral variation in applied most-favored-nation (MFN) tariﬀs. While MFN tariﬀs do
not change much over time, they do vary substantially both across sectors within countries and
across countries for a given sector.7 MFN tariﬀs are negotiated at the multilateral level over long
periods of time are less “political” than administrative measures for the regulation of imports
(e.g., anti-dumping and countervailing duties).8 Firms’ ownership structures, particularly the
degree of vertical integration, are therefore unlikely to have a systematic impact on trade policy
in general, and on MFN tariﬀs in particular.9
We collect data on applied MFN tariﬀs at the 4 digit SIC industry level for all members of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004, and examine the relation between tariﬀs and
ﬁrms’ organizational structure. In line with the predictions of our theoretical model, we ﬁnd that
higher tariﬀs on ﬁnal goods lead to more vertical integration at the ﬁrm level. The impact of
tariﬀs on vertical integration is sizable. In our preferred estimation, a 100 percent tariﬀ increase
leads to a 2.15 percent increase in the vertical integration index, implying that increasing tariﬀs
from 1 percent to their mean level of around 5 percent would increase vertical integration by
more than 8 percent. We show that this result is robust to the inclusion of other determinants
of ﬁrms’ boundary choices, and to the use of diﬀerent samples of countries and ﬁrms. We also
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of trade policy on organization is strongest in sectors where product prices
are expected to be most sensitive to tariﬀs.
An alternative strategy to verify the impact of trade policy on ﬁrm boundaries is to focus
6We follow Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009), who build on the methodology developed by Fang and
Lang (2000). Section 3.3 describes the empirical methodology in detail.
7For example, U.S. manufacturing tariﬀs in 2004 averaged 2.4 percent, with a minimum of zero and a maxi-
mum of 350 percent. As an example of cross-country variation, for a sector like SIC 3631 (Household Cooking
Equipment), MFN tariﬀs varied between zero and 29 percent, with an average of 3.15 percent.
8This is the reason why most empirical papers on the political economy of trade policy focus on non-tariﬀ
barriers rather than MFN tariﬀs. For example, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000) use data on 1983 non-tariﬀ barrier coverage ratios for the U.S. manufacturing sector to test Grossman
and Helpman (1994)’s lobbying model.
9Our empirical analysis controls for ﬁrm size and industry concentration, which could be correlated with both
the level of trade protection (Mitra, 1999; Bombardini, 2008) and vertical integration decisions.
3on trade liberalization reforms — major unilateral or multilateral liberalization episodes, or
the creation of regional trade agreements — thus exploiting time variation in the degree of
protectionism faced by ﬁrms. The challenge with implementing this strategy is data availability,
since we can only construct ﬁrm-level vertical integration measures for recent years, during which
there have been few trade liberalization reforms.10 The only major trade liberalization episode
that has occurred in recent years is arguably the entry of China into the WTO in 2001: to be
accepted as a WTO member, China had to undertake a series of important tariﬀ reductions
so as to substantially expand market access for goods from foreign countries. We examine the
organizational eﬀects of these trade policy changes, comparing the ownership structure of Chinese
ﬁrms before and after WTO accession (in 1999 and 2007). Consistent with the predictions of
our theoretical model, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level vertical integration has fallen more in sectors that
have experienced larger tariﬀ cuts.
As discussed above, our theoretical model also suggests that trade policy should aﬀect the
degree of organizational convergence across countries. In line with this prediction, we ﬁnd that
diﬀerences in sectoral vertical integration indices between two countries are signiﬁcantly larger
in sectors in which diﬀerences in MFN tariﬀs are larger. We also collect systematic information
on all regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force in 2004 and examine the relation between
the degree of sectoral organizational convergence and common membership in RTAs. We ﬁnd
that diﬀerences in vertical integration indices are around 9 percent smaller for country pairs
engaged in RTAs. Moreover, vertical integration indices are more similar (by approximately
18.5 percent) in customs unions than in free trade areas. Indeed, we would expect stronger price
and organizational convergence for members of customs unions, which impose common external
tariﬀs vis-` a-vis non-members.
Our paper contributes to a recent stream of empirical work that examines the determinants
of ﬁrms’ organizational choices. Like this paper, part of that literature focuses on vertical inte-
gration decisions (i.e., ﬁrm boundaries/ownership structure). Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton
(2009) (henceforth AJM) study the determinants of vertical integration using D&B data for 93
countries, focusing on the role of contracting costs.11 Acemoglu, Aghion, Griﬃth, and Zilibotti
(2009) use data on all British manufacturing plants to study the relationship between vertical
integration and rates of innovation. Aghion, Griﬃth and Howitt (2006) investigate whether the
propensity for ﬁrms to vertically integrate varies systematically with the extent of competition
in the product market. None of these papers focus speciﬁcally on how industry price levels aﬀect
integration. Breinlich (2008) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant increase in the level of M&A activity in Canada
10Important trade liberalization episodes, such as the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO trade
negotiations, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the free trade agreements between Eastern
European countries and the European Community, all occurred in the early or mid-nineties.
11Individually, these costs are not found to have a signiﬁcant impact on vertical integration. However, AJM
ﬁnd evidence of interaction eﬀects, i.e., more vertical integration in countries with greater contracting costs and
greater ﬁnancial development, and stronger impact of contracting costs in more capital-intensive industries.
4(but not the U.S.) as a result of trade liberalization following the 1989 Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA).12
Another stream of the literature focuses on within-ﬁrm delegation (for a given ownership
structure). Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2010), using data on medium-sized manufacturing
ﬁrms across a dozen countries, ﬁnd that greater product market competition increases decen-
tralization. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) show that the CUSFTA agreement led large U.S. ﬁrms
to ﬂatten their hierarchies.
Finally, the literature on trade and organization focuses on the impact of organization design
on the patterns of intra-ﬁrm trade and the location of multinational subsidiaries or suppliers
(e.g., Antras, 2003; Antras and Helpman, 2004; and Grossman and Helpman, 2004), without
emphasizing the role of trade policy. In addition to Conconi, Legros and Newman (2011), two
notable exceptions are Ornelas and Turner (2008), which examines how trade policy aﬀects
suppliers’ hold-up incentives, and Antras and Staiger (2008), which studies the trade policy
implications of oﬀshoring of intermediate inputs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework
and discusses the empirical implications of our model. Section 3 describes our data and the
methodology used to construct vertical integration indices. Section 4 presents our main results
on tariﬀs and vertical integration. Section 5 analyzes the impact of trade policy on the degree
of cross-country organizational convergence. The last section concludes.
2 Model
We describe a speciﬁc-factor model, in which some factors of production are mobile across sectors
while others are employed only in some sectors, and international trade is driven by cross-
country diﬀerences in factor endowments. As we elaborate below, what distinguishes our model
from its standard formulation (e.g., Mussa, 1974) is that we replace “neoclassical” ﬁrms with
“organizational” ones: production requires certain non-contractible decisions that are undertaken
by managers running diﬀerent supplier units, whose interests are imperfectly aligned with each
other and with the goal of the enterprise; the choice of ownership structure helps to govern
the tradeoﬀ between the managers’ organizational and private goals. The general property of
this model is that vertical integration generates more output than non-integration, but involves
higher (ﬁxed) costs for the managers. As a result, the price of output helps determine ﬁrm
boundary decisions; since tariﬀs aﬀect output prices, they also inﬂuence ﬁrm boundaries.
Before looking at international trade and the eﬀects of trade policy, we describe the building
blocks of the model in its closed-economy form.
12There are also various studies on vertical integration focused on single industries, e.g., Horta¸ csu and Syverson
(2007) on U.S. ready-mix concrete and Woodruﬀ (2002) on Mexican footwear.
52.1 Setup
There are K + 1 sectors/goods, denoted by 0 and k = 1,...,K; good 0 is a numeraire. The
representative consumer’s utility can be written as




where c0 is consumption of the numeraire good, and ck consumption of one of the other goods.
The utility functions uk(·) are twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave, and satisfy the
Inada conditions limci→0 u′
k(ck) = ∞ and limci→∞ u′
k(ck) = 0. Domestic demand for each good
k can then be expressed as a function Dk(pk) of its own price.
Production of good k requires the cooperation of two types of input suppliers, denoted A
and Bk. Bk suppliers generate no value without being matched with an A; A suppliers can
either match with any Bk or engage in stand-alone production of the numeraire good 0. Many
interpretations of the A and Bk ﬁrms are possible. For example, A suppliers may represent light
assembly plants or basic inputs, such as energy, or various business services (e.g., IT, retailing,
logistics) that can be used to produce basic consumer goods or combined with other inputs (Bk
suppliers) to produce more complex goods.
All goods are sold under conditions of perfect competition. There is a continuum of each
type of supplier, with a measure nk of Bk’s, and a unit measure of A’s. We assume the aggregate
supply of A’s exceeds that of the Bk’s (i.e.,
PK
k=1nk < 1) so that a positive amount of good 0 is
produced in equilibrium. The price of the numeraire good is normalized to unity.
So far, we have described a standard speciﬁc-factor model in which A suppliers represent the
mobile factor and Bk suppliers the speciﬁc factors of production. An equilibrium in the supplier
market consists of a stable match between each Bk supplier and an A supplier: given the surplus
allocation among all the suppliers, no (A,Bk) pair can form an enterprise that generates higher
than equilibrium payoﬀs for each partner. All A suppliers are equally productive when matched
with one of the Bk’s. A stand-alone A produces α units of the numeraire good. Since the price
of the numeraire is equal to unity, this also pins down the equilibrium payoﬀ for all A’s.13.
2.2 Individual Enterprises
We adopt a simple model of ﬁrm boundaries based on a tradeoﬀ between the pecuniary beneﬁts of
coordinating production decisions and managers’ private beneﬁts of operating in their preferred
ways. As in Grossman and Hart (1986), integration and non-integration both suﬀer from incentive
costs. However, in the framework described below, these emerge in a particularly tractable way:
13See Conconi, Legros and Newman (2011) for a more general setup, in which the outside option of the mobile
factor, the A suppliers, is endogenously determined
6integration, though more productive because of better coordination, imposes a ﬁxed cost on
managers, by forcing them to adopt a common “compromise” solution.14
Once an enterprise composed of an A and a Bk has formed in the supplier market, a non-
contractible decision (e.g., choosing compatible technologies, deciding on marketing campaigns)
about the way in which production is to be carried out must be made by each unit. Denote the
A and Bk decisions respectively by a ∈ [0,1] and bk ∈ [0,1]. Successful production requires
coordination between the two suppliers. More precisely, the enterprise will succeed with a
probability 1 − (a − bk)2, in which case it generates R > 0 units of output; otherwise it fails,
yielding 0. Output realizations are independent across enterprises (A-Bk pairs). We allow R to
vary across enterprises, so it can be interpreted as some measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity.
Managers are risk-neutral and bear a private cost of implementing the decision made by their
units. The A manager’s utility is yA − (1 − a)2, the Bk manager’s is yk − b2
k, where yA,yk ≥ 0
are their respective incomes and (1−a)2 and b2
k are their costs. Though both managers of the A
and Bk units enjoy monetary returns, they view their operations diﬀerently: A’s most preferred
action is 1, while Bk’s is 0. For instance, a standardized production line could be convenient for
the sectorally-mobile A suppliers, but may not ﬁt the speciﬁc design needs of the Bk suppliers.
Because managers’ primary function is to implement decisions and convince their workforces to
comply, they bear the cost of decisions even if they don’t make them.
Assignment of decision rights via possible sale of assets is the organizational design problem
in the model. Managers may remain non-integrated and retain control over their respective
decisions. Or they can choose to integrate into a single ﬁrm by engaging a headquarters (HQ),
transferring to it, in exchange for an acquisition feww, a share of the realized revenue and the
power to decide a and bk. HQ is motivated only by monetary considerations (the desire to
maximize the integrated ﬁrm’s income) and incurs no costs for operating in a particular way.
Before production, Bk managers match with A managers and sign contracts specifying an
ownership structure and payment scheme. For simplicity, we take the payment scheme to be a
ﬁxed payment T from Bk to A. Because A’s are in excess supply, they must all receive α in
equilibrium. Thus T will just cover A’s anticipated private cost of production together with the
opportunity cost α.15
For each match (A,Bk), total revenue in event of success is given by the number of units
produced, R, times the product market price, pk, which is taken as given and correctly anticipated
when managers and HQ’s sign the contracts and make their decisions. After contracts are signed,
managers and HQ’s make their production decisions, output is realized, product is sold, and
14It is this feature that leads to the main comparative static for our empirical investigation: at low prices, rev-
enues are small enough that managers are more concerned with their private beneﬁts and remain non-integrated;
at higher prices, output is more valuable, so managers prefer vertical integration.
15In general, Bk may prefer to give A a positive contingent share of revenue. This complicates notation but
does not change any qualitative conclusion regarding the dependence of integration on price (see Legros and
Newman, 2009).
7revenue shares are distributed.
Integration
HQ’s are elastically supplied at a cost normalized to zero. After paying its acquisition fee and
receiving its compensating share of revenue, an HQ’s payoﬀ is proportional to (1−(a−bk)2)Rpk.16
HQs decide both a and bk, and since their incentive is to maximize he integrated ﬁrms’ expected
revenue, they choose a = bk. Among the choices in which a = bk, the Pareto-dominant one is
that in which a = bk = 1/2, which minimizes the total cost of the A and Bk managers. We
assume HQs implement this choice. The private cost to each manager is then
1
4, and the payoﬀs
to the A and Bk managers are equal to α and Rpk − α − 1
2, respectively (thus T = α + 1
4).
Non-integration
Under non-integration, managers retain control of their respective activities. The decisions
chosen are the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the game with payoﬀs T − (1 − a)2 for A, who
chooses a, and (1 − (a − bk)2)Rpk−b2
k −T for Bk, who chooses bk. Nash decisions are a = 1 and
bk = Rpk/(1 + Rpk), with resulting expected output 1 − 1
(1+Rpk)2. Notice that output increases
with price: as pk becomes larger, the revenue motive becomes more important for Bk managers,
pushing them to better coordinate with their A partners. The equilibrium transfer from Bk to
A under non-integration is T = α; the payoﬀs are α for A’s and
(Rpk)2
1+Rpk − α for Bk’s.
Choice of Ownership Structure
To determine managers’ choice of ﬁrm boundaries, we must compare their payoﬀs under integra-
tion and non-integration. Notice that A suppliers obtain α in both cases, so they are indiﬀerent
about the organizational choice. Bk suppliers obtain a higher payoﬀ under integration if and




1+Rpk or pk > 1/R. Thus managers’ organizational choices depend on product
prices. At low prices, revenues are small enough that integration’s better output performance
is not valuable enough to the Bk to be worth the private cost he would have to bear; thus, Bk
opts for the “quiet life” of non-integration, wherein both proﬁts and costs are low. At higher
prices, the Bk manager’s revenue motive now makes higher output and therefore coordination
more valuable. Coordinating under non-integration would entail large and costly concessions
from Bk to A, who chooses a = 1 independently of the price; the compromise choice a = bk = 1
2,
is now preferable, so Bk chooses to integrate. Clearly, the price at which an enterprise integrates
is lower when its productivity R is higher.
16The size of HQ’s share is indeterminate and could be pinned down in many ways not modeled here; all that
matters for our purposes is that it is positive.
82.3 Product Market Equilibrium and the OAS Curve
A general equilibrium for the economy entails clearing supplier and product markets. We have
already characterized the supplier market: some A suppliers produce by themselves α units of the
numeraire good; others are matched with Bk suppliers for the production of goods k = 1,...,K
and receive α.
In product market k, the large number of enterprises implies that with probability one the
supply is equal to the expected value of output given pk; equilibrium requires that this price
adjusts so that demand equals supply.
To derive industry supply, suppose R is distributed in the population according to some
continuous c.d.f. G(R) with mean 1 and support [R,R]. Since all enterprises in industry k
with R < 1/pk remain non-integrated, and the remaining ones integrate, total supply at price














If pk < 1/R, supply is nk
R R
R R(1 − ( 1
1+Rpk)2)dG(R); if pk > 1/R, it is nk.
Figure 1: The OAS and market equilibrium
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Figure 1 depicts the Organizationally Augmented Supply (OAS) curve, which incorporates
9the ownership structure decisions of the industry’s enterprises as well as the usual price-quantity
relationship. It also illustrates the price regions indicated by the black arrows in which enterprises
are all non-integrated (N), all integrated (I), and the middle range in which only the more
productive ones integrate (Mix). When pk < 1/R, the industry is entirely non-integrated,
but supply increases with price, since non-integration expected output increases. As price rises
above 1/R, the most productive enterprises integrate, producing more than they would under
non-integration; those that remain non-integrated also produce more, so that industry output
rises further. Once pk reaches 1/R, all ﬁrms are integrated and industry supply is ﬁxed at nk (the
mean R being 1) for prices higher than that threshold. In the absence of trade, the equilibrium
price ˆ pk equates domestic supply and demand.
Observe that, for a given market price pk, more productive enterprises (those with higher
R) are more likely to be vertically integrated. The degree of integration of the industry (i.e.,
the fraction 1 − G(1/ˆ pk) of ﬁrms that integrate) is therefore a nondecreasing function of the
equilibrium price, strictly increasing on [R,R].
2.4 Trade Policy and Firms’ Organization
The world consists of C small countries, indexed by c, which have identical demands and tech-
nologies in the production of all goods. Trade is the result of endowment diﬀerences between
countries. In particular, we assume that the countries can be divided into two homogeneous
groups: a “Home” set H of countries relatively more endowed in the speciﬁc factors necessary
to produce goods k ∈ {m + 1,...,K}; and a “Foreign” set F of countries (denoted with a “*”)
relatively more endowed in the speciﬁc factors necessary to produce goods k ∈ {1,...,m}. We
thus have nk < n∗
k for k ∈ {1,...,m} and nk > n∗
k for k ∈ {m + 1,...,K}. Good 0, the
numeraire, is always traded freely across countries. We choose units so that the international
market-clearing and the domestic price of good 0 in each country equal unity.
Each country c imposes an exogenously-given ad valorem tariﬀ tc
k ≥ 0 on import-competing
good k. In sectors k ∈ {1,...,m} domestic prices are thus equal to pc
k = (1 + tc
k)Pk in Home
countries and pc∗
k = Pk in Foreign countries, where Pk denotes the international price. This is




























denotes Home imports and Xc∗
k = S(Pk) − D(Pk)

















10From (3) and (4) we can derive an expression for international equilibrium prices as a function
of the tariﬀs applied by all countries, that is, Pk(tk) for k ∈ {1,...,m}, and Pk(t∗
k) for k ∈
{m + 1,...,K}, where tk = {tc
k}c∈H and tk = {tc∗
k }c∗∈F (the separable form of demand ensures
that the world product price in one sector depends only on tariﬀs imposed by importing countries
in that sector).


















0 = 0, (5)
where Zc
0 denotes the net transfer of the numeraire good to settle the trade balance. A similar
condition must hold for a Foreign country.
Figure 2: Firm organization in the presence of a tariﬀ
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Trade policies aﬀect ownership structures through their impact on product prices. In partic-
ular, an increase in tc
k leads to an increase in the domestic price of good k; an enterprise with
productivity R will choose integration if that price exceeds 1/R. Figure 2 depicts the OAS curve
of industry k in country c. In this example, absent any tariﬀ, the domestic price would be equal
to the world price Pk, and all ﬁrms in the domestic industry would be non-integrated. Now
consider a non-prohibitive tariﬀ tc
k that raises the domestic price to pc
k = Pk(1 + tc
k), which lies
between 1/R and 1/R. At this price, more productive enterprises (with R > 1/pc
k) will integrate
11and less productive ones will remain non-integrated. Clearly, a lower tariﬀ would lead to fewer
integrated ﬁrms, a higher one to more. Integration thus increases with the tariﬀ level.
The model can also be used to examine how trade policy aﬀects the degree of organizational
convergence across countries. In particular, for a given country pair cc′, the diﬀerence in degree
of integration within a sector k will depend on the diﬀerences in their applied tariﬀs: the more
similar tc
k and tc′
k , the smaller the diﬀerence between pc
k and pc′
k and the more similar ﬁrms’
organizational choices within industry k.
Finally, consider a country pair cc′ that has signed a regional trade agreement that eliminates
all tariﬀs between them. This implies that prices should tend to convergence across member
countries. We would also expect customs unions, in which members adopt common external
tariﬀs, to be characterized by more similar ownership structures than free trade areas, in which
diﬀerences in external tariﬀs, together with problems in implementing rules of origins, reduce
the extent of price and organizational convergence.17
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, the main results of our theoretical model can be
summarized as follows:
1. Higher tariﬀs on ﬁnal goods should lead ﬁrms to be more vertically integrated.
2. Country pairs should have more similar ownership structures in sectors where they have
similar levels of protection; RTAs, especially customs unions, should display similar own-
ership structures among members.
Sections 4 will examine the empirical validity of the ﬁrst of these predictions, while Section 5
will focus on the second.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 The WorldBase Database
We use data for 2004 from Dun & Bradstreet’s WorldBase, a database of public and private
plant-level observations in more than 200 countries and territories.18 The leading U.S. source
of commercial credit and marketing information since approximately 1845, Dun & Bradstreet
(D&B) presently operates in diﬀerent countries and territories either directly or through aﬃliates,
agents, and associated business partners.
WorldBase is the core database with which D&B populates its commercial data products in-
cluding Who Owns WhomTM, Risk Management SolutionsTM, Sales & Marketing SolutionsTM,
17See Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (1999), for a comparison of diﬀerent types of regional trade agreements
and a discussion of rules of origin in free trade areas.
18The dataset is not publicly available but was released to us by Dun and Bradstreet. For more information
see: http://www.dnb.com/us/about/db database/dnbinfoquality.html.
12and Supply Management SolutionsTM. These products provide information about the “activ-
ities, decision makers, ﬁnances, operations and markets” of the clients’ potential customers,
competitors and suppliers. D&B compiles their data from a wide range of sources, including
partner ﬁrms in dozens of countries, telephone directory records, websites, and self-registration.
All information is veriﬁed centrally via a variety of manual and automated checks.
Early uses of D&B data include Caves’ (1975) analysis of size and diversiﬁcation patterns
between Canadian and U.S. plants. More recently, Harrison, Love, and McMillian (2004) used
D&B’s cross-country foreign ownership information. Other studies that have used D&B data
include Black and Strahan’s (2002) study of entrepreneurial activity in the United States, Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Mitton’s (2009) cross-country study of concentration and vertical integra-
tion, and Alfaro and Charlton’s (2009) analysis of vertical and horizontal activity by multina-
tionals.
WorldBase, albeit not without problems, is best suited to our analysis having four main
advantages over most other sources. First, the data include both listed and non-listed plants,
and information that supports aggregation at the ﬁrm level. Second, Amadeus and other data
sources restricted to Europe are not useful for our purposes because they lack broad coverage of
countries in particular developing countries, with diﬀerent levels of trade barriers. WorldBase
by contrast has data in more than 200 countries and territories. Third, D&B compiles data
from a wide range of sources, whereas other databases collect data primarily from national ﬁrm
registries. The wide variety of sources from which D&B collects data reduces the likelihood that
the sample frame will be determined by national institutional characteristics. Finally, over its
many years in business, D&B has devised many methods of checking its data and assuring the
reliability of its dataset.19
3.2 The Sample
We use data from the 2004 WorldBase ﬁle, excluding records that lack primary industry and year
started, for a total of more than 24 million observations. The unit of observation in WorldBase
is the establishment (a single physical location at which business is conducted or services or
industrial operations are performed) rather than the ﬁrm (one or more domestic establishments
under common ownership or control). Establishments, which we also refer to as plants, have
their own addresses, business names, and managers, but might be partly or wholly owned by
other ﬁrms. Plants can be linked via information on domestic and global parents using the
DUNS numbers.20 Our analysis is at the ﬁrm level, that is, we consider all plants connected by
19See Alfaro and Charlton (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the WorldBase data and comparisons with
other data sources.
20D&B uses the United States Government Department of Commerce, Oﬃce of Management and Budget,
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation Manual 1987 edition to classify business establishments. The Data Universal
Numbering System — The D&B D-U-N-S Number — introduced in 1963, to identify businesses numerically for
data-processing purposes, supports the linking of plants and ﬁrms across countries and tracking of plants histories
13the same global or domestic parent to be one unit (see discussion below).
We use four categories of data recorded by WorldBase records for each establishment:
1. Industry information: the 4-digit SIC code of the primary industry in which each estab-
lishment operates, and for most countries, the SIC codes of as many as ﬁve secondary
industries, listed in descending order of importance.
2. Ownership information: information about the ﬁrms’ family members (number of family
members, its domestic parent and its global parent).21
3. Location information: country, state, city, and street address of each family member (used
to link establishments within a family to the relevant tariﬀ data).
4. Basic operational information: sales and employment.
We exclude countries and territories with fewer than 80 observations and those for which
the World Bank provides no data. We further restricted the sample to Word Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) members for which we have data on tariﬀs/regional trading arrangements (see the
discussion below).
We focus on manufacturing ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms with a primary SIC code between 2000 and
3999), which best ﬁt our theory of vertical integration. We exclude government/public sector
ﬁrms, ﬁrms in the service sector (for which we have no tariﬀ data) or agriculture (due to the
existence of many non-tariﬀ barriers), and ﬁrms producing primary commodities (i.e., mining
and oil and gas extraction).
We exclude ﬁrms with fewer than 20 employees, as our theory does not apply to self-
employment or small ﬁrms with little prospect of vertical integration (see also Acemoglu, Aghion,
Griﬃth, and Zilibotti, 2010).22
We focus on ﬁrms that operate in only one country, since this provides a cleaner analysis
of the eﬀects of tariﬀs and RTAs on ﬁrms’ ownership structure. This is because the degree of
vertical integration of these ﬁrms depends only on the prices of the country in which they are
located. In the case of multinational corporations (MNCs), on the other hand, it is harder to
identify the relevant prices and tariﬀs. Moreover, focusing on national ﬁrms, avoids issues having
to do with the strategic behavior of multinationals across markets (e.g., transfer pricing, tariﬀ
jumping).23 Multinationals are included in the robustness analysis. There, we split MNCs into
including name changes.
21D&B also provides information about the ﬁrm’s status (joint-venture, corporation, partnership) and its
position in the hierarchy (branch, division, headquarters).
22Restricting the analysis to ﬁrms with more than 20 employees enables us to correct for possible diﬀerences
in the the collection of small ﬁrms data across countries.
23We describe an establishment as foreign-owned if it satisﬁes two criteria: (1) it reports to a global parent
ﬁrm, and (2) the parent ﬁrm is located in a diﬀerent country. Parents are deﬁned in the data as entities that
have legal and ﬁnancial responsibility for another ﬁrm. For purposes of matching the tariﬀ data, we use the SIC
code of the domestic parent for multinationals.
14separate entities — one for each country — in order to link organizational structure to domestic
tariﬀs.
Table A-1 in the Appendix lists the countries included in our main sample.24 As a robustness
check, we also exclude countries for which we have fewer than 1,000 plants that are part of ﬁrms
with at least 20 employees (see also Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006). The countries included
in this restricted sample are listed in Table A-2.
We next describe the construction of ﬁrm-level vertical integration indices, and all other
variables used in our empirical analysis. Appendix Table A-3 presents summary statistics for all
variables.
3.3 Vertical Integration Indices
Constructing measures of vertical integration is highly demanding in terms of data, requiring
ﬁrm-level information on sales and purchases of inputs by various subsidiaries of a ﬁrm. Such
data are generally not directly available and, to the best of our knowledge, there is no source for
such data for a wide sample of developed and developing countries.
To measure the extent of vertical integration for a given ﬁrm, we build on the methodology
used by AJM. We combine WorldBase information on plant activities and ownership structure
with input-output data to determine related industries and construct the vertical integration
coeﬃcients V
f,k,c
j in activity j, where k is the primary sector in which ﬁrm f in country c is
active. Note that the sample in AJM is restricted to a maximum of the 30,000 largest records per
country in the 2002 WorldBase ﬁle (a limit imposed by cost constraints).25 Having information
for a broader sample of more than 24 million establishments in the 2004 WorldBase ﬁle, we are
able, as discussed below, to link establishments to ﬁrms.
Given the diﬃculty of ﬁnding input-output matrices for all the countries in our dataset,
we follow AJM in using the U.S. input-output tables to provide a standardized measure of
input requirements for each sector. As the authors note, the U.S. input-output tables should
be informative about input ﬂows across industries to the extent that these are determined by
technology.26
The input-output data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Benchmark IO
Tables, which include the make table, use table, and direct and total requirements coeﬃcients
24Further restrictions were imposed by data availability constraints related to the control variables as explained
in the next subsections.
25For many countries, this restriction is not binding. For countries with more than 30,000 observations, AJM
select the 30,000 largest, ranked by annual sales. They include all industries, except those operating only in
“wholesale trade” and “retail trade.”
26Note that the assumption that the U.S. IO structure carries over to other countries can potentially bias our
empirical analysis against ﬁnding a signiﬁcant relationship between vertical integration and prices by introducing
measurement error in the dependent variable of our regressions. In addition, using the US input-output tables
to construct vertical integration indices for other countries mitigates the possibility that the IO structure and
control variables are endogenous.
15tables. We use the Use of Commodities by Industries after Redeﬁnitions 1992 (Producers’ Prices)
tables. While the BEA employs six-digit input-output industry codes, WorldBase uses the SIC
industry classiﬁcation. The BEA website provides a concordance guide, but it is not a one-to-
one key.27 For codes for which the match was not one-to-one, we randomized between possible
matches in order not to overstate vertical linkages. The multiple matching problem, however, is
not particularly relevant when looking at plants operating only in the manufacturing sector (for
which the key is almost one-to-one).
For every pair of industries, i, j, the input-output accounts support calculation of the dollar
value of i required to produce a dollar’s worth of j. We construct the input-output coeﬃcients
for each ﬁrm f, IO
f
ij by combining the SIC information for each plant in each ﬁrm, the matching
codes, and the U.S. input-output information. Here, IO
f
ij ≡ IOij ∗ I
f
ij, where IOij is the input-
output coeﬃcient for the sector pair ij, stating the cents of output of sector i required to produce
a dollar of j, and I
f
ij ∈ {0,1} is an indicator variable that equals one if and only if ﬁrm f owns
plants in both sectors i and j. A ﬁrm that produces i as well as j will be assumed to supply itself
with all the i it needs to produce j; thus, the higher IOij for an i-producing plant owned by the
ﬁrm, the more integrated in the production of j the ﬁrm will be measured to be. Adding up the
input-output coeﬃcients IO
f
ij for all inputs i, gives the ﬁrm’s degree of vertical integration in j.
To illustrate the procedure, consider the following example from AJM (2009) of a Japanese
establishment with, according to WorldBase, one primary activity, automobiles (59.0301), and
two secondary activities, automotive stampings (41.0201) and miscellaneous plastic products




Autos 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000
Stampings 0.0780 0.0017 0.0000
Plastics 0.0405 0.0024 0.0560
SUM 0.1228 0.0041 0.0560
The table is a restriction of the economy-wide IO table to the set of industries in which
this establishment is active (i.e., it contains all of the positive IO
f
ij values). For example, the
IOij coeﬃcient for stampings to autos is 0.078, indicating that 7.8 cents worth of automotive
stampings are required to produce a dollar’s worth of autos. Because this plant has the internal
capability to produce stampings, we assume it produces itself all the stampings it needs.28 The
bottom row shows the sum of the IO
f
ij for each industry. For example, given that 12.3 cents
worth of the inputs required to make autos can be produced within this plant, we would say
27This concordance is available upon request. The BEA matches its six-digit industry codes to 1987 U.S. SIC
codes http://www.bea.gov/industry/exe/ndn0017.exe.
28Many industries have positive IOij coeﬃcients with themselves; for example, miscellaneous plastic products
are required to produce miscellaneous plastic products. Any ﬁrm that produces such a product will therefore be
measured as at least somewhat vertically integrated.
16that the degree of vertical integration for this plant is 0.123.
Our main unit of observation, however, is all plants that belong to the same ﬁrm, that is, all
plants that report to the same headquarters. For example, if the plant in the example above is
reported to be the headquarters of another Japanese plant (subsidiary), we consider the activities
of both plants in constructing a measure of vertical integration for the ﬁrm. In the case of multi-
plant ﬁrms, restricting analysis to the plant level may underestimate the number of activities
carried out within the ﬁrm’s boundaries.










the sum of the IO coeﬃcients for each industry in which the ﬁrm is active. Our measure of
vertical integration is based on the ﬁrm’s primary activity:
Vf,k,c = V
j
f,k,c,j = k. (7)
In the case multi-plant ﬁrms (plants connected by the same global ultimate or headquarters),
we consider the main activity of the headquarters or domestic parent.29
The approach we follow to identify vertical integration infers a ﬁrm’s level of vertical in-
tegration from information about the goods it produces in each of its establishments and the
aggregate input-output relationship among those goods. The advantage of this method is that
one need not worry about the value of intra-ﬁrm activities being aﬀected by transfer pricing.
Another advantage is that using I-O tables avoids the arbitrariness of classiﬁcation schemes that
divide goods into “intermediate” and other categories (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001).30
Summary statistics for ﬁrm-level vertical integration are presented in Appendix Table A-3,
while Table A-4 reports average vertical integration indices by sector (at the 2-digit SIC level).31
Table A-5 compares the ﬁrm-level vertical integration index across the diﬀerent samples. Our
29It should be noted that this measure does not consider payments to capital and labor services and is thus
always less than unity. Indeed, in the U.S. an industry pays on average around 56 % of gross output to interme-
diates, the rest being value added. Thus, even a fully vertically integrated ﬁrm in a typical sector would have an
index of only 0.56.
30An alternative would be to measure actual intra-ﬁrm transactions for a large set of countries. A recent
study by Horta¸ csu and Syverson (2009) on U.S. ﬁrms combines Census data, the Commodity Flow Survey, and
ZIP code information to measure intra-ﬁrm trade, ﬁnding that shipments from upstream units to downstream
units are rather low. If shipments between diﬀerent units of the same ﬁrms are indeed very limited, we could
be overestimating the degree of vertical integration for multi-plant ﬁrms. This, however, does not represent a
serious concern for our analysis, since most ﬁrms in our dataset have only one establishment (see Table A-3).
Restricting the sample to single-plant ﬁrms yields qualitatively similar results, which are available upon request.
31Diﬀerences in methodology and samples restrict comparisons with AJM. However, the authors report a mean
of 0.0487 and median of 0.0334 for their vertical integration index. For our main sample, the primary sector
vertical integration index has a mean of 0.0627 and a median of 0.0437 (see Table A-3). The ordering of industries
by degree of vertical integration in Table A-4 is also similar to that reported by AJM.
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main sample consists of 196,586 domestic manufacturing ﬁrms with at least 20 employees located
in 80 countries. The histogram in Figure 3 reports the distribution of vertical integration indices
for all ﬁrms in our main sample. According to our measure, most ﬁrms produce relatively few
inputs in house: the median vertical integration index is around 0.044 and the mean is 0.063.
3.4 Trade Policy
To empirically assess the impact of market prices on ownership structure, we use data on applied
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariﬀs and on Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which oﬀer a
plausibly exogenous source of price variation to the boundaries of the ﬁrm. As argued in the
introduction, ownership structure is unlikely to have a systematic impact on the determination of
trade policies in general, and MFN tariﬀs in particular. These are negotiated at the multilateral
level over long periods of time and are less “political” than unilateral forms of protection such
as anti-dumping duties.32 RTAs are regulated by GATT/WTO rules (GATT Article XXIV and
the Enabling Clause) and are also likely to be independent of ﬁrms’ organizational choices.
Tariﬀs
We collect applied MFN tariﬀs at the 4-digit SIC level for all WTO members for which this
information is available. We restrict the set of countries to WTO members, because they are
32No theory relates ﬁrms’ vertical integration decisions to the incentives to form a lobbying group. Even if
one allows that lobbying can play a role in determining MFN tariﬀs, it is not obvious how the direction of the
political pressure (pro or anti trade) and its extent (e.g., size of campaign contributions) could be systematically
related to ﬁrms’ organizational choices across a large set of countries and sectors. However, MFN tariﬀs may
be correlated with other (omitted) variables associated with both ﬁrms’ potential to lobby and the incentives to
vertically integrate. For example, larger ﬁrms, which are more likely to vertically integrate, may be more eﬀective
at lobbying for protection (e.g., Mitra, 1999; Bombardini, 2008). For this reason, in our empirical analysis we
control for ﬁrm size, industry concentration and other variables suggested by the literature.
18constrained under Article I of the GATT by the MFN principle of non-discrimination: each
country c must apply the same tariﬀ tc
k to all imports of good k that originate in other WTO
member countries; preferential treatment is allowed only for imports that originate in RTA
members or in developing countries.
The source for MFN tariﬀs is the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, which
combines information from the UNCTAD TRAINS database (default data source) with the WTO
integrated database (alternative data source). Tariﬀs are for 2004 unless unavailable for that
year in which case the closest available data point in a ﬁve year window around 2004 (2002-2006)
is chosen with priority given to earlier years.33 The original classiﬁcation for tariﬀ data is the
harmonized system (HS) 6-digit classiﬁcation. Tariﬀs are converted to the more aggregate SIC
4-digit level using internal conversion tables of WITS. Here, SIC 4-digit level MFN tariﬀs are
computed as simple averages over the HS 6 digit tariﬀs.
We also construct for each 4-digit SIC sector and every country the fraction of imports to
which MFN tariﬀs apply using information on RTAs (see below) and subtracting from total
sectoral imports those that originate in countries with which the importer has a common RTA.
Bilateral import data at the 4-digit SIC level for 2004 are from the COMTRADE database.
RTAs
We collect information on RTAs in force in 2004 from the WTO Regional Trade Agreements
Information System (RTA-IS).34,35 The legal basis for the creation of RTAs can be found in
GATT/WTO Article XXIV (for agreements involving developed member countries) and the En-
abling Clause (for agreements among only developing countries). Under Article XXIV, member
countries can form free trade areas (FTAs) or customs unions (CUs) covering “substantially all
trade”, that require complete duty elimination and ﬁxed timetables for implementation. The
conditions contained in the Enabling Clause being much less stringent, RTAs between developing
member countries may eﬀectively involve less trade liberalization. Thus we construct the dummy
RTA that equals one whenever two countries belong to a common trade agreement formed under
Article XXIV. This variable does not include a number of preferential trade agreements under
the Enabling Clause that do not imply the full elimination of trade barriers. Alternatively, we
construct separate dummy variables for customs unions and free trade agreements. We expect
the former, which imply a common external tariﬀ and no internal trade barriers, to have a
stronger eﬀect on organizational convergence than the latter, which permit member countries to
maintain diﬀerent external tariﬀs.
33For example, if data are available for 2003 and 2005, but not 2004, the 2003 data are chosen.
34Available online (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx).
35Note that the dataset does not include trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),
such as the U.S. African Opportunity Act program or the E.U. Everything but Arms program.
193.5 Other Controls
We collect a number of country- and sector-speciﬁc variables to control for alternative factors
emphasized in the literature on vertical integration.
In terms of country-speciﬁc variables, the empirical and theoretical literatures have studied
the role of institutional characteristics and ﬁnancial development.36 We use the variable “rule
of law” from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) as a measure of the Legal quality of a
country’s institutions. This is a weighted average of a number of variables (perception of inci-
dences of crime, eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and enforceability of contracts)
between 1997 and 1998. The variable ranges from 0 to 1 and is increasing in the quality of
institutions. We also use private credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
as a fraction of GDP in 2004 taken from Beck, Demigurc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) as a measure
of a country’s Financial development.
We also include diﬀerent kinds of sector-speciﬁc variables, to proxy for exogenous variation
in sector characteristics suggested by the literature, such as the severity of hold-up problems.
First, we construct sectoral Capital intensity at the 4-digit-SIC level for the United States. Data
comes from the NBER-CES manufacturing industry database (Bartelsmann and Gray, 2000). In
line with the literature, capital intensity is deﬁned as the log of total capital expenditure relative
to value added averaged over the period 1993-1997. Second, we use Nunn’s (2007) measure
of Relationship speciﬁcity, which proxies for the severity of hold-up problems. For each sector
in the U.S., this variable measures the fraction of inputs not sold on an organized exchange
or reference priced. We convert the data for 1997 from the BEA’s input-output classiﬁcation
to 4-digit U.S.-SIC.37 Third, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) in constructing the variable
External dependence, which measures (at the sectoral level, using the U.S. as a benchmark) the
fraction of investment that cannot be ﬁnanced with internal cash ﬂows. The authors identify an
industry’s need for external ﬁnance (the diﬀerence between investment and cash generated from
operations) under two assumptions: (i) that U.S. capital markets, especially for the large, listed
ﬁrms they analyze, are relatively frictionless enabling us to identify an industry’s technological
demand for external ﬁnance; (ii) that such technological demands carry over to other countries.
Following their methodology, we construct similar data for the period 1999-2006.38 Finally, to
control for domestic industry concentration, we construct Herﬁndahl indices for each country-
36Poor legal institutions may aﬀect vertical integration decisions through their impact on the severity of hold-
up problems. A suﬃcient level of ﬁnancial development may be necessary for upstream and downstream ﬁrms
to be able to integrate. As AJM note, the eﬀect of each of these variables may be ambiguous when considered
separately and there are more robust predictions of their combined eﬀect.
37Nunn’s dataset is available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn.
38An industry’s external ﬁnancial dependence is obtained by calculating the industry median of external ﬁ-
nancing of U.S. companies using data from Compustat calculated as: (Capex-Cashﬂow)/Capex, where Capex
is deﬁned as capital expenditures and Cashﬂow as cash ﬂow from operations. Industries with negative external
ﬁnance measures have cash ﬂows that are higher than their capital expenditures.
20sector using sales of all plants in that sector.39
In the regressions on organizational convergence, we also use a number of bilateral variables
from CEPII: bilateral distance measured as the simple distance between the most populated
cities (in km), dummies for contiguity, for common oﬃcial or primary language, and common
colonial relationship (current or past). In some speciﬁcations, we also use information on GDP
for the year 2004 obtained from the World Development indicators 2008.
4 Tariﬀs and Vertical Integration
In this section, we assess the empirical validity of the main prediction of our theoretical model
that higher tariﬀs lead to more vertical integration at the ﬁrm level. The section is divided in four
parts. First, we exploit cross-sectional variation in applied MFN tariﬀs to verify whether trade
policy aﬀects ﬁrms’ ownership structures in the way predicted by our model. Second, we report
the results of a series of estimations aimed at verifying whether tariﬀs aﬀect ﬁrms’ ownership
structure through their impact on product prices. Third, we exploit time-series variation in the
degree of protection faced by ﬁrms, examining the organizational eﬀects of China’s accession
to the WTO. Finally, we discuss the results of a series of additional robustness checks using
diﬀerent samples.
4.1 Cross-sectional evidence
To examine the organizational eﬀects of trade policy, we ﬁrst exploit variation in applied MFN
tariﬀs across countries and sectors. We estimate the following panel regression model:
Vf,k,c = α + β1Tariffk,c + β2Employmentf + β3Xk,c + δk + δc + ǫf,k,c. (8)
The dependent variable is the vertical integration index of ﬁrm f with primary sector k located
in country c, as deﬁned in (7). We take logs of (one plus) the vertical integration index to
mitigate problems with outliers.40
Our main regressor of interest is the variable Tariﬀk,c, which is the log of (one plus) the MFN
tariﬀ applied in sector k by country c.41 Our model predicts that higher ﬁnal good tariﬀs within
39These include sales by foreign-owned plants that operate in the given country-sector.






where Nf is the number of industries in which ﬁrm f is active. The results on tariﬀs are consistent, but somewhat
less signiﬁcant. This is not surprising, as our regressions consider the eﬀects of MFN tariﬀs applied to a ﬁrms’
primary activity not to all of its activities. We also used the log of the vertical integration index (removing zero
observations) obtaining similar results. There are very few zeros in the dependent variable, so there is no need
to perform a Tobit analysis. All results not shown due to space considerations are available upon request.
41Tariﬀs are expressed in ad-valorem terms. In the main speciﬁcations, we use log of (one plus MFN tariﬀ)
in order to be able to include zero tariﬀs. Although the distribution of tariﬀs is extremely skewed, log tariﬀs
are approximately normally distributed. Using, in alternative speciﬁcations, the log of the tariﬀ variable yields
21an industry should lead ﬁrms in that industry to be more vertically integrated. We thus expect
the coeﬃcient β1 to be positive.
The set of additional explanatory variables includes number of employees, Employmentf,
which allows us to control for the relation between ﬁrm size and ownership structure.42 Recall
that our model predicts that more productive ﬁrms, as proxied by ﬁrm size, are more likely to
be integrated for a given market price.43 We thus expect the coeﬃcient β2 to be positive.
The vector Xk,c consists of diﬀerent interactions between sector and country characteristics,
previously suggested by papers on the determinants of vertical integration (e.g., interaction
between a sector’s Capital intensity and a country’s level of Financial development). All variables
are expressed in logs. We also include sector ﬁxed eﬀects at the 4-digit SIC level (δk), which
allows us to capture cross-industry diﬀerences in technological or other determinants of vertical
integration (e.g., a sector’s Capital intensity). Finally, we add country ﬁxed eﬀects (δc), which
capture cross-country diﬀerences in institutional determinants of vertical integration (e.g., a
country’s level of Financial development and the quality of its contracting institutions) and also
control for country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the way ﬁrms are sampled.44 Given that tariﬀs vary
only at the sector-country level, while the dependent variable varies at the ﬁrm level, we cluster
standard errors at the sector-country level.
Table 1 reports the main results. Notice that, in all speciﬁcations, the estimated coeﬃcient
for the MFN tariﬀ is positive and signiﬁcant. Thus, consistently with the ﬁrst prediction of our
theoretical model, higher tariﬀs lead ﬁrms to be more vertically integrated. Column (1) presents
the results of the basic speciﬁcation, which includes the MFN tariﬀ, ﬁrm size, and country and
sector ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimate for β1 implies that a 100 percent tariﬀ increase leads to a 2.15
percent increase in the vertical integration index. In terms of economic magnitudes, this implies
that an increase in manufacturing tariﬀs from 1 percent to their mean level of 4.85 percent (a
385 percent increase) increases vertical integration by 0.0215*385=8.28 percent.
Note that tariﬀs act as a proxy variable for domestic prices. Thus, the estimate for β1 can
be interpreted as the impact of prices on vertical integration if and only if prices and tariﬀs vary
one to one. This would be true for a competitive economy that is small and imposes a speciﬁc
tariﬀ. In the case of ad-valorem tariﬀs, this relation would be weaker. If a country is large, i.e.,
can aﬀect world prices, imposing a tariﬀ will have an impact on the world price and the elasticity
similar results.
42Our dataset contains diﬀerent numbers of ﬁrms from diﬀerent countries. This variation in the selection of
samples of ﬁrms could be a source of variation in vertical integration. The main source of the problem would be
potential correlation between vertical integration and ﬁrm size (combined with diﬀerential selection on ﬁrm size
across countries). Controlling for ﬁrm size alleviates this problem.
43See, for example, Bernard, Jensen, Eaton, and Kortum (2003) for evidence on the close relationship between
ﬁrm size and productivity.
44D&B samples establishments in the formal sector (and there are, of course, diﬀerences in the size of the
formal sector across rich and poor countries). In the robustness checks, we try an alternative way to control for
this by restricting the sample to countries for which we have at least 1,000 plants that are part of ﬁrms with at
least 20 employees.
22of domestic prices with respect to tariﬀs will also be less than one.45 Moreover, if ﬁrms have
market power, tariﬀ will tend to have smaller eﬀects on domestic prices (see Section 4.2). These
arguments imply that the estimate for β1 should be interpreted as a lower bound on the impact
of prices on vertical integration. The true impact is likely to be substantially larger.
Turning to the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on vertical integration, we ﬁnd that, holding constant
the domestic price level, larger ﬁrms are more vertically integrated. A 100 percent increase in
employment leads to a 4.25 percent increase in the ﬁrm’s level of vertical integration.46
In columns (2) and (3) we add diﬀerent sets of controls to account for other determinants
of vertical integration, as suggested by the literature. In column (2), we include two interac-
tion terms, one between Capital intensity and Financial development and one between Capital
intensity and Legal quality. Note that the tariﬀ coeﬃcient remains relatively unchanged and sig-
niﬁcant at the one-percent level. The estimate for the interaction term between Capital intensity
and Financial development is also highly signiﬁcant, indicating that more capital intensive sec-
tors are more integrated in countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets. The interaction
term between Capital intensity and Legal quality has the expected negative sign but it is not sig-
niﬁcant. In column (3), we include two alternative interaction terms, one between Relationship
speciﬁcity and Legal quality and one between External dependence and Financial development.
Again, tariﬀs are positive and highly signiﬁcant and the interaction terms insigniﬁcant.47
As mentioned above, the determination of MFN tariﬀs is arguably less political than other
forms of protection (e.g., anti-dumping duties). Although there is no theory suggesting that
vertically integrated ﬁrms should be particularly interested or able to obtain high levels of
protection, one may worry that MFN tariﬀs could be correlated with omitted variables associated
with ﬁrms’ ownership structures. For example, larger ﬁrms, which are more likely to be vertically
integrated, may be more eﬀective at lobbying for protection, leading to higher MFN tariﬀs.
The results discussed so far already control for ﬁrm size and unobserved industry and country










Pk , where the ﬁrst part on the right is the direct impact of an ad-valorem tariﬀ
on domestic prices (< 1) and the second term is the terms of trade eﬀect (< 0). Notice also that, to the extent
that countries are able to manipulate tariﬀs to improve their terms of trade, high tariﬀs are likely to be observed
precisely in sectors in which they increase domestic prices only by a small amount. Broda, Limao and Weinstein
(2008) provide evidence that non-WTO countries exploit their market power in trade by setting higher tariﬀs on
goods that are supplied inelastically. Ludema and Mayda (2010) provide similar evidence for WTO countries.
46One may be concerned about endogeneity of ﬁrm size with respect to vertical integration, since the integration
decision aﬀects ﬁrm size. This could upward bias the coeﬃcient of ﬁrm size and make all estimates inconsistent.
To address this issue, we have instrumented ﬁrm employment with predicted employment that we obtain by
regressing ﬁrm employment on a set of sector-country dummies. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of employment
increases to 0.675 for the basic speciﬁcation (column 1), while the tariﬀ coeﬃcient remains unaﬀected – the
estimate is 0.0222 and strongly signiﬁcant. Estimates for the other speciﬁcations also remain the same and are
omitted for the sake of space but are available on request. Thus, potential endogeneity of employment does not
aﬀect the tariﬀ coeﬃcient.
47These results are broadly consistent with the theoretical framework described by AJM. Their empirical
analysis ﬁnds a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the interaction between Capital intensity and Legal Quality, but
does not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for the interaction between Capital intensity and Financial development.
23characteristics. In addition, columns (4)-(6) in Table 1 include Herﬁndahl indices to control for
the possibility that high industry concentration leads to both high tariﬀs and vertical integration.
As seen in the table, point estimates for the tariﬀ coeﬃcient remain similar in terms of both
magnitude and signiﬁcance. The Herﬁndahl indices, however, are not signiﬁcant.
4.2 Interactions with Sector Characteristics
Next, we discuss a series of additional estimations that we have performed to verify whether
tariﬀs aﬀect ﬁrms’ ownership structure through their impact on product prices. The results of
these estimations are presented in Table 2.
First, we would expect a tariﬀ to have a larger impact on the domestic price of the importing
country – and thus on ﬁrm organization – when the share of trade to which it applies is larger.
To verify this, in column (1) we have added to our basic controls the variable MFN share,
capturing the fraction of imports to which MFN tariﬀs apply in a given country and sector, and
the interaction between this variable and the MFN tariﬀ. The coeﬃcient in the ﬁrst row now
measures the impact of tariﬀs when the MFN share is zero. Not surprisingly, this coeﬃcient
is non-signiﬁcant, since in this case MFN tariﬀs should have no impact on the price faced by
domestic ﬁrms. The interaction term is instead positive and signiﬁcant at the one-percent level,
indicating that the eﬀect of MFN tariﬀs on vertical integration is positive and increasing in their
importance for import volumes.48
In columns (2) and (3) we verify whether the eﬀect of tariﬀs on ﬁrms’ vertical integration is
larger in more competitive industries. Indeed, there is a presumption that tariﬀ pass-through
should be larger when ﬁrms have no market power (see, for example, Helpman and Krugman
(1989), Chapter 3). Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2007) provide empirical evidence on the re-
lation between tariﬀ pass-through on domestic prices and market power. They estimate import
demand elasticities and ﬁnd the implied pass-through to be signiﬁcantly higher for commodi-
ties than for diﬀerentiated products (deﬁned according to Rauch (1999)’s classiﬁcation). Their
ﬁndings imply that sectors with more homogeneous products should be characterized by higher
import demand elasticities and larger tariﬀ pass-through.49
In column (2), we interact our tariﬀ variable with the import demand elasticities estimated by
Broda, Greenﬁeld, Weinstein (2006).50 In particular, for each country and sector, we construct
a dummy for High import elasticity, which is equal to one whenever the elasticity is above
the median for the country. In this speciﬁcation, the partial eﬀect of MFN tariﬀ is ˆ β1 + ˆ β6×
High Import Elasticity. The coeﬃcient β1 now measures the impact of MFN tariﬀs on vertical
48Evaluated at the mean MFN share, the eﬀect of the MFN tariﬀ is 0.0185, with a standard error of 0.006,
and is signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
49Similarly, Campa and Goldberg (2005) ﬁnd a larger exchange rate pass-through for commodities than for
diﬀerentiated products
50We thank David Weinstein for making this data available to us.
24integration when the import elasticity is low. The coeﬃcient is 0.019 and signiﬁcant at the one
percent level. The coeﬃcient of MFN tariﬀs when the elasticity is high is ˆ β1+ˆ β6 = 0.019+0.011 =
0.03 and signiﬁcantly (at the 5 percent level) larger than when the elasticity is low. Thus, tariﬀs
have a stronger eﬀect on ﬁrm organization in sectors in which products are more homogeneous.
Finally, as an alternative test for the relation between tariﬀ pass-through and domestic market
power, in column (3) we include an interaction between MFN tariﬀs and the Herﬁndahl indices
we have constructed for each country-sector. In this speciﬁcation, the partial eﬀect of the tariﬀ is
ˆ β1+ ˆ β8× Herﬁndahl, while the coeﬃcient ˆ β1 now measures the impact of MFN tariﬀs on vertical
integration when the concentration index is zero. Notice that ˆ β1 is now 0.0298 and signiﬁcant
at the one percent level; ˆ β8 is negative (-0.0480) and signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This
implies that tariﬀs have a smaller eﬀect on vertical integration when the industry concentration
index is high.51 Therefore – as expected – tariﬀs have a stronger eﬀect on the degree of ﬁrms’
vertical integration in less concentrated sectors.
Speciﬁcations (4)-(6) simply repeat speciﬁcations (1)-(3), adding some additional controls
emphasized by the literature on vertical integration (interactions a sector’s capital intensity
with a country’s ﬁnancial development and legal quality). These results conﬁrm that tariﬀs have
a larger eﬀect on ﬁrm-level vertical integration precisely in those sectors in which tariﬀ changes
should lead to larger prices changes.
4.3 China’s Accession to the WTO
As noted in the introduction, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 is arguably the only major
trade liberalization episode that has occurred in the last decade, for which we can use D&B data
to construct vertical integration measures. To be accepted as a member of the WTO, China
agreed to undertake a series of important commitments to better integrate in the world economy
and oﬀer a more predictable environment for trade and foreign investment in accordance with
WTO rules.52 In particular, China had to substantially expand market access to goods from
foreign countries, reducing its import tariﬀs from an average of 13.3 percent in 2001 to 6.8
percent by the end of the implementation period.53
Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the comparison of two periods, a pre-accession one
and a post-accession one, to verify whether ﬁrm-level vertical integration was reduced by more in
those sectors that experienced larger tariﬀ cuts. We thus construct vertical integration measures
for all Chinese manufacturing ﬁrms that are in the WorldBase dataset for the years 1999 (pre
51Evaluated at the mean of Herﬁndahl, the partial eﬀect of tariﬀs is 0.023 with a standard error of 0.0057 and
is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Note that in this speciﬁcation also the direct eﬀect of Herﬁndahl, ˆ β, (which
measures the eﬀect of concentration on vertical integration when tariﬀs are zero) is positive and signiﬁcant at
the one percent level.
52A detailed list of China’s commitments can be found in its Protocol of Accession. China’s accession implied
few trade policy changes for other WTO members, since most of them had already been granting it MFN status.
53The implementation period lasted until 2010, though most tariﬀ reductions had to be completed by 2005.
25accession) and 2007 (post accession), following the same procedure described in Section 3.3.
We use 2007 instead of 2004 as the post-accession period because we expect ﬁrms’ ownership
structure to react slowly to price changes induced by tariﬀ reductions.
Figure 4 provides the histograms of the MFN tariﬀs applied by China in 1999 and 2007. This
is based on those manufacturing sectors for which we observe ﬁrms (with at least 20 employees,
excluding multinationals) in both years, consisting of almost 29,000 ﬁrms that we observe in at
least one year. For the sectors in this sample, applied tariﬀs fell from an average 20 to an average
of 9.9 percent between 1999 and 2007, with a lot variation across sectors.54 At the same time,
the average level of vertical integration for the sample of ﬁrms declined from 0.111 to 0.084.
Figure 4: Chinese import tariﬀs, 1999 and 2007
In what follows, we examine whether Chinese ﬁrms have adjusted their ownership structure
following WTO accession. To this purpose, we run two sets of regressions. First, we use the
same speciﬁcation as in our main test (8), using only those sectors for which we observe some
ﬁrms in both 1999 and in 2007:
Vf,k,t = α + β1Tariﬀk,t + β2Employmentf,t + β3Herﬁndahlk,t + δk + δt + ǫf,k,t. (9)
We expect the coeﬃcient of Tariﬀk,t to be positive. Notice that, by controlling for sector ﬁxed
eﬀects, we exploit the time variation of tariﬀs within sectors. Speciﬁcally, the tariﬀ coeﬃcient is
identiﬁed by the deviation of ﬁrm-level vertical integration from its sector mean that is due to
the time variation in tariﬀs relative to their sector mean. Given that we only consider sectors
for which we can observe ﬁrms in both periods, sector averages of vertical integration and tariﬀs
are well identiﬁed. General trends in vertical integration, which may be due to other reforms
54The maximum reduction in tariﬀs was 415 percent (SIC 3578, Calculating and Accounting Machines), the
median reduction was 51 percent. Only in a few sectors, tariﬀs did not change or actually increased (e.g., SIC
2084 Wines, Brandy and Brandy Spirits).
26Figure 5: Chinese vertical integration indices, 1999 and 2007
that occurred in China over the sample period, are picked up by time dummies.55
In a second set of regressions, we focus on within-ﬁrm variation in VI indices. Unfortunately,
the overlap between the ﬁrms sampled in 1999 and 2007 is small. Once we exclude multinationals
and plants with less than 20 employees, as we have done in our earlier analysis, there are 144
ﬁrms that we can observe in both years. For this set of ﬁrms, we take time diﬀerences of equation
(9) and estimate
∆Vf,k = α+β1∆Tariﬀk+β2∆Employmentf +β3∆Herﬁndahlk+β4Privatizationk+∆ǫf,k. (10)
We expect the coeﬃcient of ∆MFNk to be positive. In these regressions, we control not only
for changes in ﬁrm size and industry concentration, but also for changes in the degree of state
ownership, by including the variable Privatization. This measures the fraction of government-
owned ﬁrms that were privatized in a given sector (at the 2-digit industry level) between 1999
and 2004 and is taken from Bai, Lu and Tao (2009).
Table 3 presents the results for both sets of regressions. Columns (1)-(3) reports the results
for the regressions with sector dummies. In all speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
(at the one percent level) coeﬃcient on the tariﬀ variable, implying larger reductions in vertical
integration in sectors that have experienced larger tariﬀ reductions. The coeﬃcient magnitude
is around 0.03, which is slightly larger than our cross-section estimates. The coeﬃcient on
employment is also positive, signiﬁcant and also similar to the cross-section results in terms
of magnitude. Finally, the level of industry concentration has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on vertical
integration.
Turning to the speciﬁcation in diﬀerences, in columns (4)-(7) we obtain similar results. The
55In these regressions, unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects are implicitly assumed to be common for all ﬁrms in a
given sector.
27coeﬃcient of tariﬀ changes is always positive, signiﬁcant and very similar in magnitude to the
speciﬁcation with sector dummies. In column (5) we add changes in ﬁrms’ employment as control,
which leaves the tariﬀ coeﬃcient unaﬀected. Column (6) adds Privatization as a control, which
is insigniﬁcant and also leaves the coeﬃcient of tariﬀs unchanged.56 Finally, in column (7), we
also control for changes in industry concentration by including a Herﬁndahl index, which further
reduces sample size to 71 observations because information on sales is missing for some sectors.
While changes in tariﬀs remain positive and signiﬁcant, changes in industry concentration have
no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
4.4 Robustness Checks
In the remainder of the section, we discuss the results of a series of additional estimations to
verify the robustness of our results on tariﬀs and ﬁrms’ vertical integration. The tables reporting
these results are in the Appendix.
In a ﬁrst set of regressions, we add multinational ﬁrms to the main sample. As noted above,
because multinational ﬁrms have plants in diﬀerent countries, the relevant product price for
their organizational decisions and what tariﬀs might be distorting it is unclear. We thus split
multinationals into separate entities by country and use the primary activity of the respective
domestic ultimate to which a plant belonging to a multinational reports as the decisive price.57
Table A-6 reports the results for speciﬁcation (8) including multinationals. We ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient for MFN tariﬀs remains positive and strongly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
We then repeat our main analysis for the sample of countries for which we observe at least
1,000 plants that are part of ﬁrms with at least 20 employees. Results for speciﬁcation (8),
presented in Table A-7, are almost unchanged. Point estimates for the tariﬀ coeﬃcient remain
similar in magnitude, and the signiﬁcance of the estimates is not aﬀected by restricting the
sample of countries.58
Our theoretical model predicts that a ﬁrm should be more integrated when the tariﬀ on its
ﬁnal product is higher. Tables 1-A-7 provide strong empirical support for this prediction. One
could be concerned, however, that these results may driven by input tariﬀs, which are often
highly correlated with tariﬀs on ﬁnal goods. To deal with this concern, we have run a series
of additional estimations in which we have included input tariﬀs. We construct sector-country-
speciﬁc input tariﬀs as weighted averages of 4-digit SIC applied MFN tariﬀs, using normalized
56As an alternative we have also used information on government ownership from World Base, which, however,
is highly incomplete for 1999. Results are unaﬀected by using this alternative control.
57Note also that because multinationals are usually active in many sectors the primary SIC code of their global
ultimate is not necessarily a good measure of their primary activity.
58In a series of additional regressions we used an alternative measure of vertical integration, constructed based




f,k,c, where Nf is the number
of industries in which ﬁrm f is active. The coeﬃcients for MFN tariﬀs remained strongly signiﬁcant but, not
surprisingly, they dropped slightly in magnitude. The results of these regressions are available upon request.
28IO-coeﬃcients from the US input-output table as weights. We rerun all the versions of our main
speciﬁcation (8) that are reported in Table 1, adding log input tariﬀs or log one plus input tariﬀs
as an additional control variable. In all speciﬁcations, our main result continues to hold, i.e., the
higher the tariﬀ on the ﬁnal good produced by a ﬁrm, the more vertically integrated the ﬁrm
is. The coeﬃcient of ﬁnal good tariﬀs is unaﬀected in size and remains signiﬁcant at the one
percent level.59
5 Trade Policy and Organizational Convergence
The purpose of this section is to assess the validity of the second prediction of our model on the
relationship between cross-country diﬀerences in ownership structure and their trade policies.
For each country, we construct an industry measure of vertical integration by estimating the
following regression model:
Vf,k,c = βEmploymentf + Vk,c + ǫf,c. (11)
The estimate for the sector-country dummy ˆ Vk,c gives us a measure of the average level of vertical
integration of industry k in country c, controlling for the eﬀect of ﬁrm size (employment) on the
average level of vertical integration in that industry-country pair. All variables are expressed in
logs.
5.1 Tariﬀ Diﬀerences
We ﬁrst examine whether cross-country diﬀerences in sectoral organizational structure are af-
fected by diﬀerences in tariﬀs. Our model predicts that, for a given country-pair cc′, organiza-
tional diﬀerences should be smaller for sectors characterized by similar levels of protection. To
verify this, we estimate the following model:
|ˆ Vk,c − ˆ Vk,c′| = α + β1|Tariﬀk,c − Tariﬀk,c′| + β2|Xk,c − Xk,c′| + δk + δc,c′ + ǫk,c,c′. (12)
The dependent variable is the absolute diﬀerence between countries c and c′ in the estimated
vertical integration indices for sector k (from equation (11) above). All diﬀerences are expressed
in logs. The main regressor of interest is the (log of the) absolute diﬀerence between these
countries’ MFN tariﬀs in sector k. The term |Xk,c − Xk,c′| captures diﬀerences in other sector-
country characteristics that may aﬀect the degree of organizational convergence. Note that,
because we are including dyad ﬁxed eﬀects (δc,c′), β1 is identiﬁed by the cross-sectoral variation
59The results of these estimations are available upon request. The coeﬃcient on input tariﬀs is also positive
and of similar magnitude as the one on ﬁnal tariﬀs, but is only signiﬁcant in some of the speciﬁcations.
29in the tariﬀ diﬀerence for a given country pair. To allow for correlation of the errors between
sectors for a given country pair, we cluster standard errors by dyad.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 4, the only explanatory variable is the log-diﬀerence in MFN
tariﬀs. In line with our predictions, we ﬁnd that, for a given country-pair diﬀerences in sectoral
vertical integration indices are signiﬁcantly (at the one percent level) larger in sectors in which
diﬀerences in MFN tariﬀs are larger. A 100 percent increase in the diﬀerence in MFN tariﬀs
leads to a roughly 0.9 percent increase in the diﬀerence in vertical integration indices.
The second column adds interactions between Capital intensity and diﬀerences in Financial
development and Legal quality. The coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence in MFN tariﬀs remains rela-
tively unchanged in magnitude and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The interaction term of
Capital intensity with Legal quality is positive and strongly signiﬁcant while the interaction term
of Capital intensity with the diﬀerence in Financial development is positive but not signiﬁcant.
The third column includes, as alternative control variables, the diﬀerence in Financial develop-
ment interacted with External dependence, and the diﬀerence in Legal quality interacted with
Relationship-dependence. Whereas the coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence in MFN tariﬀs is relatively
higher and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, both interaction terms are negative with the relation
between Legal quality and Relationship-dependence variables being signiﬁcant.
In the middle and right panel of Table 4, we report the results of robustness checks using dif-
ferent samples. As done for the results presented in Section 4, we ﬁrst try adding multinationals
to our main sample, and then restrict the sample to countries for which we observe at least 1,000
plants that are part of ﬁrms with at least 20 employees. Adding multinationals to the analysis,
we ﬁnd in columns (4)-(6) that the impact of tariﬀ diﬀerences on diﬀerences in vertical integra-
tion remains positive and highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. With respect to the results on
organizational convergence when the sample size is restricted, tariﬀ diﬀerences continue to have
a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on diﬀerences in vertical integration in all speciﬁcations, as can be
seen from columns (7)-(9).
5.2 Regional Trade Agreements
In the remainder of this section, we examine the relation between the degree of sectoral organi-
zational convergence and common membership in a regional trade agreement. In contrast to the
previous regressions, a causal interpretation of these regression results is more diﬃcult, since it
is possible that countries that are generally more similar are more likely to form RTAs.
To assess the validity of our third empirical prediction, we explore how RTAs aﬀect the extent
to which two countries have similar vertical integration structures at the industry level.
|ˆ Vk,c − ˆ Vk,c′| = α + β1RTAc,c′ + β2Xc,c′ + δk + δc + δc′ + ǫk,c,c′. (13)
The dependent variable is as in model (12), expressed as before in logs. The main regressor
30of interest is now RTAc,c′, a dummy that equals one if countries c and c′ are members of the
same RTA. The vector Xc,c′ captures a series of bilateral controls, such as dummies for contigu-
ity, common language, and colonial relationship, as well as variables that capture the distance
between countries, and diﬀerences in GDP (diﬀerences expressed in logs of absolute values).
Finally, we include sector ﬁxed eﬀects (δk) and country ﬁxed eﬀects (δc and δc′). Standard errors
are clustered by country-pair.
Table 5 presents the results for this regression. The left panel presents the estimates obtained
when using our main sample. In the ﬁrst column of the left panel, in which we include only a
dummy for regional trade agreements, the coeﬃcient of RTA is negative and signiﬁcant at the
one-percent level. This implies that the diﬀerence in vertical integration indices for a country
pair in an RTA is about 9.2 percent smaller than for a country pair without an RTA. The results
for an alternative speciﬁcation, which separates customs unions (CUs) from free trade areas
(FTAs), are presented in column two. As expected, the quantitative impact on organizational
convergence is greater for CUs than for FTAs. Country pairs that belong to the same CU have
a approximately 18.5% smaller diﬀerence in organizational structure than country pairs without
a RTA, while membership to FTAs has no signiﬁcant impact on diﬀerences in organizational
structure. In the third column, we keep the coeﬃcients for CUs and FTAs separate and add
a series of bilateral control variables that may have an impact on similarity of organizational
structure. The coeﬃcient for CUs is reduced somewhat in size, but remains signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. Contiguity and common language have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the
diﬀerence in vertical integration indices, while diﬀerences in GDP have a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect. Colonial relationship and distance do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the degree of organizational
convergence.
The middle and right panels of Table 5 show that the results for regional trade agreements are
also robust to using diﬀerent samples. Membership in RTAs, and CUs in particular, continues to
reduce diﬀerences in vertical integration among member countries when we include multination-
als in our analysis, as shown in columns (4)-(6). The results continue to hold when we restrict
the sample to the subset of countries for which we have more than 1000 observations, though
the coeﬃcient for CUs is insigniﬁcant in column (9), where we control for other country-pair
variables. Note however, that in this case we have only 33 country pairs instead of 101.60
6 Conclusions
Traditional organizational economics has studied ownership decisions without much regard for
markets. Given technology and contractibility, there is a uniquely optimal organizational design,
the one that delivers the goods at least cost. Demand plays no role.
60Note that we have more countries (101 instead of 80) than in the tariﬀ regressions. This is because tariﬀ
data are not available for some countries, whereas data on RTAs are.
31This paper provides evidence for the more recent view that markets do matter and that de-
mand is an essential determinant of ﬁrm boundaries. Demand aﬀects product prices, prices aﬀect
proﬁtability, and proﬁtability aﬀects the tradeoﬀs organization designers face when determining
ownership structures. This causal link is captured by a model in which vertical integration gen-
erates more output than non-integration because of its comparative advantage in coordinating
operating decisions. But it imposes higher private costs on enterprise managers, forcing them
to accommodate to common ways of doing things. At low prices, the productivity gains from
integrating have little value, and managers choose non-integration. At high prices, the relative
value of coordination increases, favoring integration.
To assess the validity of the model’s predictions, we examine the organizational eﬀects of trade
policy, which provides a source of price variation that is exogenous to ﬁrms’ ownership decisions.
We use a new dataset that enables us to construct ﬁrm-level vertical integration indices for a
large set of countries. To study the link between product prices and ﬁrm boundaries, we exploit
cross-country and cross-sectional diﬀerences in applied MFN tariﬀs, as well as time variation in
the degree of protection faced by ﬁrms. In line with the model’s predictions, we ﬁnd that market
conditions — in particular the level of product prices — do aﬀect vertical integration: higher
tariﬀs on ﬁnal goods lead ﬁrms to be more vertically integrated, and this eﬀect is stronger in
sectors where product prices are expected to be more sensitive to tariﬀs.
Our empirical results thus lend support to a simple model of the determination of ﬁrm
boundaries. As such, they have implications beyond the positive theory of the ﬁrm. If integra-
tion generates more output than non-integration, as it does in our model, then organizational
choices aﬀect consumer welfare and aggregate economic performance (Legros and Newman, 2009;
Conconi, Legros and Newman, 2011). This calls for a reassessment of the eﬀects not only of
tariﬀs, but of any price-distorting policy, in light of its potential impact on the organization and
productivity of ﬁrms.
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35Table 1: Tariﬀs and Firm-Level Vertical Integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariﬀk,c 0.0215*** 0.0214*** 0.0212*** 0.0225*** 0.0223*** 0.0220***
(0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0059)
Employmentf 0.0425*** 0.0425*** 0.0425*** 0.0442*** 0.0442*** 0.0442***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Capital intensityk x Financial Developmentc 0.0319** 0.0396**
(0.0147) (0.0193)
Capital intensityk x Legal Qualityc -0.0837 -0.1030
(0.0580) (0.0731)
Relation Speciﬁcityk x Legal Qualityc -0.0349 -0.0409
(0.0296) (0.0347)
External Dependencek x Financial Developmentc 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0013) (0.0017)
Herﬁndahlk,c 0.0110 0.0113 0.0106
(0.0231) (0.0229) (0.0230)
# Observations 196,586 196,586 196,586 178,199 178,199 178,199
# Sectors 386 386 386 386 386 386
R2 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.123 0.123 0.123
Sector Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country- Country- Country- Country- Country- Country-
sector sector sector sector sector sector
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signiﬁcance. Dependent variable: log of one plus the vertical integration
index of ﬁrm f, with primary sector k, located in country c. The sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employees in the manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs.
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6Table 2: Tariﬀs and Firm-Level Vertical Integration, Interactions with Sector Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariﬀk,c 0.0050 0.0191*** 0.0298*** 0.0058 0.0183*** 0.0295***
(0.0078) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0059)
Employmentf 0.0426*** 0.0429*** 0.0442*** 0.0426*** 0.0429*** 0.0441***
(0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0047)
MFN sharek,c -0.017 -0.0148
(0.0198) (0.0197)
Tariﬀk,c x MFN sharek,c 0.0248*** 0.0233***
(0.0073) (0.0075)
High import elasticityk,c -0.0239*** -0.0256***
(0.0081) (0.0081)




Tariﬀk,c x Herﬁndahlk,c -0.0480*** -0.0472***
(0.0104) (0.0103)
Capital Intensityk x Financial Developmentc 0.0290* 0.0378*** 0.0382*
(0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0199)
Capital Intensityk x Legal Qualityc -0.0733 -0.118** -0.0957
(0.0586) (0.0545) (0.0749)
# Observations 196,586 173,587 178,199 196,586 173,587 178,199
# Sectors 386 358 386 386 358 386
R2 0.122 0.129 0.123 0.123 0.129 0.123
Sector Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country- Country- Country- Country- Country- Country-
sector sector sector sector sector sector
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signiﬁcance. Dependent variable: log of one plus the vertical integration
index of ﬁrm f, with primary sector k, located in country c. The sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employment in the manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs.
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7Table 3: Tariﬀs and Firm-Level Vertical Integration, China’s Accession to the WTO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vertical Integration Change in Vertical Integration






Change Tariﬀk 0.0343* 0.0344* 0.0346* 0.0433*
(0.0204) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0232)






Observations 28,872 28,872 13,641 144 144 144 74
Sectors 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.921 0.922 0.903 0.039 0.039 0.04 0.082
Sector Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
Time Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signiﬁcance. In columns (1)- (3), the dependent variable is the log of one
plus the vertical integration index of ﬁrm f, with primary sector k; in columns (4)-(6), it is the change in the log of one plus the vertical integration index
between 1999 (pre accession) and 2007 (post accession). The sample includes Chinese ﬁrms observed in 1999 and 2007 ≥ 20 employees in the manufacturing
sector, excluding MNCs.
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8Table 4: Tariﬀ Diﬀerences and Organizational Convergence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Main Sample Including Multinationals Countries > 1,000 plants
Diﬀ. Tariﬀsk,c,c′ 0.0089*** 0.0086** 0.0095** 0.0199*** 0.0208*** 0.0217*** 0.0091** 0.0070* 0.0087**
(0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Cap. Intensityk x diﬀ. 0.0020 0.0029 -0.0118
Fin. Developmentc,c′ (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0075)
Cap. Intensityk x diﬀ. 0.0419*** 0.0477*** 0.0568***
Legal Qualityk,c,c′ (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0074)
Ext. Dependencek x diﬀ. -0.0057 -0.00673*** -0.00582***
Fin. Developmentc,c′ (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Rel. Speciﬁcityk x diﬀ. -0.0553*** -0.0519*** -0.0650***
Legal Qualityc,c′ (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0075)
# Observations 212,770 171,908 171,908 233,105 187,182 187,182 142,573 121,709 121,709
# Country pairs 80 80 80 80 80 80 33 33 33
R2 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.146 0.147 0.148 0.171 0.172 0.172
Sector Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Diadic Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signiﬁcance. Dependent variable: log of (one plus) the absolute diﬀerence
between countries c and c′ in the estimated vertical integration index of ﬁrms with primary sector k. In columns (1)-(3) the sample include ﬁrms ≥ 20
employees in the manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs; in columns (4)-(6), the sample includes MNCs; in columns (7)-(9), the sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20
employment in the manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs, located in countries with at least 1,000 plants.Table 5: Regional Trade Agreements and Organizational Convergence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Main Sample Including Multinationals Countries ≥ 1000 plants
RTAc,c′ -0.0921*** -0.0874*** -0.0474
(0.0235) (0.0205) (0.0299)
Customs Unionc,c′ -0.185*** -0.0760* -0.177*** -0.0748* -0.127*** -0.0132
(0.0376) (0.046) (0.0323) (0.0396) (0.0489) (0.061)
Free Trade Areac,c′ -0.0404 0.0203 -0.0356 0.0222 -0.00944 0.0531
(0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.032) (0.0336)
Contiguityc,c′ -0.196*** -0.155*** -0.237***
(0.0754) (0.0641) (0.0852)
Common Colonyc,c′ 0.0663 0.0631* 0.000
(0.0421) (0.0348) (0.0746)
Common Languagec,c′ -0.119*** -0.109*** -0.159***
(0.0313) (0.0275) (0.0433)
Distancec,c′ 0.0188 0.0220* 0.0145
(0.0146) (0.0129) (0.0211)
Diﬀerence GDPc,c′ 0.0389*** 0.0357*** 0.0280**
(0.0087) (0.0074) (0.0121)
# Observations 299,649 299,649 299,649 328,756 328,756 328,756 210,475 210,475 210,475
# Country pairs 101 101 101 101 101 33 33 33 33
R2 0.109 0.109 0.111 0.09 0.091 0.093 0.118 0.119 0.122
Sector Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair Country-pair
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signiﬁcance. Dependent variable: log of (one plus) the absolute diﬀerence
between countries c and c′ in the estimated vertical integration index in the primary sector k. In columns (1)-(3), the sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employees
in the manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs; in columns (4)-(6), the sample includes MNCs; in columns (7)-(9), the sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employment
in the manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs, located in countries with at least 1,000 plants.
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Table A-1: Sample Frame
WB code Freq. Percent Cum. WB code Freq. Percent Cum.
ALB 4 0.00 0.00 MAR 603 0.31 61.52
ARG 998 0.51 0.51 MDG 18 0.01 61.53
AUS 5,079 2.58 3.09 MEX 2,641 1.34 62.87
AUT 1,464 0.74 3.84 MLI 13 0.01 62.88
BEL 928 0.47 4.31 MOZ 16 0.01 62.89
BEN 4 0.00 4.31 MUS 46 0.02 62.91
BFA 8 0.00 4.32 MWI 2 0.00 62.91
BGD 6 0.00 4.32 MYS 3,101 1.58 64.49
BGR 360 0.18 4.50 NER 1 0.00 64.49
BOL 55 0.03 4.53 NIC 21 0.01 64.50
BRA 5,594 2.85 7.38 NLD 676 0.34 64.84
CAN 7,469 3.80 11.18 NOR 847 0.43 65.27
CHE 1,150 0.58 11.76 NZL 959 0.49 65.76
CHL 454 0.23 11.99 OMN 67 0.03 65.80
COL 550 0.28 12.27 PAK 4 0.00 65.80
CRI 176 0.09 12.36 PER 888 0.45 66.25
CZE 1,736 0.88 13.24 PHL 351 0.18 66.43
DEU 19,302 9.82 23.06 PNG 4 0.00 66.43
DNK 425 0.22 23.28 POL 446 0.23 66.66
ECU 183 0.09 23.37 PRT 5,433 2.76 69.42
ESP 2,322 1.18 24.55 PRY 50 0.03 69.45
FIN 448 0.23 24.78 ROM 614 0.31 69.76
FRA 8,965 4.56 29.34 RWA 2 0.00 69.76
GAB 3 0.00 29.34 SAU 314 0.16 69.92
GBR 6,622 3.37 32.71 SEN 47 0.02 69.94
GHA 81 0.04 32.75 SGP 790 0.40 70.35
GRC 2,231 1.13 33.89 SLV 129 0.07 70.41
GTM 93 0.05 33.93 SWE 689 0.35 70.76
HND 77 0.04 33.97 TGO 4 0.00 70.76
HUN 2,346 1.19 35.17 THA 507 0.26 71.02
IDN 233 0.12 35.29 TTO 79 0.04 71.06
IND 2,592 1.32 36.60 TUN 991 0.50 71.57
IRL 587 0.30 36.90 TUR 2,557 1.30 72.87
ISR 1,538 0.78 37.68 TZA 24 0.01 72.88
ITA 8,426 4.29 41.97 UGA 37 0.02 72.90
JAM 43 0.02 41.99 URY 114 0.06 72.96
JOR 148 0.08 42.07 USA 52,917 26.92 99.87
JPN 34,441 17.52 59.59 VEN 231 0.12 99.99
KEN 134 0.07 59.66 ZAF 1 0.00 99.99
KOR 3,060 1.56 61.21 ZMB 17 0.01 100.00
Total 196,586 100.00
Notes: Data from 2004 WorldBase data, Dun & Bradstreet. Sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employees in the
manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs.
41Table A-2: Sample Frame: Restricted Sample
WB code Freq. Percent Cum.
ARG 998 0.53 0.53
AUS 5,079 2.68 3.21
AUT 1,464 0.77 3.98
BEL 928 0.49 4.47
BRA 5,594 2.95 7.43
CAN 7,469 3.95 11.37
CHE 1,150 0.61 11.98
CZE 1,736 0.92 12.9
DEU 19,302 10.2 23.09
DNK 425 0.22 23.32
ESP 2,322 1.23 24.54
FIN 448 0.24 24.78
FRA 8,965 4.74 29.52
GBR 6,622 3.5 33.01
GRC 2,231 1.18 34.19
HUN 2,346 1.24 35.43
IND 2,592 1.37 36.8
IRL 587 0.31 37.11
ISR 1,538 0.81 37.92
ITA 8,426 4.45 42.37
JPN 34,441 18.19 60.56
KOR 3,060 1.62 62.18
MEX 2,641 1.39 63.58
MYS 3,101 1.64 65.21
NLD 676 0.36 65.57
NOR 847 0.45 66.02
NZL 959 0.51 66.52
PRT 5,433 2.87 69.39
SGP 790 0.42 69.81
SWE 689 0.36 70.18
TUN 991 0.52 70.7
TUR 2,557 1.35 72.05
USA 52,917 27.95 100
Total 189,324 100
Notes: Data from 2004 WorldBase data, Dun & Bradstreet. Sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employment in the
manufacturing sector located in countries with at least 1000 plants, excluding MNCs.
42Table A-3: Summary Statistics
Median Mean Std. Dev. N
Vertical Integration Indexf,k,c 0.044 0.063 0.063 196,586
Tariﬀk,c 2.480 4.849 7.253 196,586
Employmentf 38.000 98.936 472.395 196,586
Herﬁndahlk,c 0.053 0.132 0.188 196,586
Capital Intensityk -2.857 -2.902 0.458 387
Relationship Speciﬁcityk -0.456 -0.526 0.356 387
Financial Dependencek -0.756 -0.524 3.058 387
Financial Developmentc 0.332 0.554 0.479 80
Legal Qualityc 0.545 0.583 0.209 80
Diﬀerence Ver. Int. Indexk,c,c′ -1.593 -1.707 1.614 299,649
Diﬀerence GDPc,c′ 0.450 0.201 1.812 299,649
Distancec,c′ 9.017 8.629 0.965 299,649
Regional Trade Agreement (RTA)c,c′ 0.000 0.263 0.440 299,649
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)c,c′ 0.000 0.148 0.355 299,649
Customs Union (CU)c,c′ 0.000 0.115 0.319 299,649
Contiguityc,c′ 0.000 0.041 0.139 299,649
Colonial Relationshipc,c′ 0.000 0.020 0.178 299,649
Common Languagec,c′ 0.000 0.122 0.328 299,649
Notes: Vertical integration indices, employment and Herﬁndahl constructed using plant-level data from 2004
WorldBase, Dun & Bradstreet. Tariﬀ data from TRAINS/WTO. Information on regional trade agreements from
WTO. Capital Intensity from NBER-CES manufacturing industry database. Relationship speciﬁcity from Nunn
(2007). Financial dependence from Compustat, following Rajan and Zingales (1998). Financial development from
Beck, Demigurc-Kunt and Levine (2006). Legal quality from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004). GDP
from World Bank. Contiguity, colonial relationship, and common language from CEPII. Vertical integration
index, MFN tariﬀs, employment and Herﬁndahl are in levels; all other variables are in logs, with the exception
of RTA, FTA, CU, contiguity, colonial relationship, and common language, which are indicator variables.
43Table A-4: Vertical Integration by 2-digit SIC industry




PRIMARY METAL PRODUCTS 33 0.091
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 36 0.089
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 37 0.067
PETROLEUM REFINING 29 0.062
LEATHER 31 0.062
RUBBER AND PLASTICS 30 0.060
MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL 35 0.060
MANUFACTURING NEC 39 0.059
LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 24 0.059
FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 20 0.056
TOBACCO MANUFACTURES 21 0.053
STONE, CLAY, GLASS, & CONCRETE 32 0.049
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 34 0.039
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 27 0.039
SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS 38 0.036
PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 26 0.034
FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 25 0.022
Notes: Data from 2004 WorldBase data, Dun & Bradstreet. Sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employment in the
manufacturing sector, excluding MNCs.
44Table A-5: Sample Comparisons: Vertical Integration Indices
Main sample Excluding countries Including MNCs
< 1,000 plants
# of plants 225,212 217,723 279,869
# of connected plants 29,214 29,008 64,789
# of connected ﬁrms 6,830 6,768 10,224
# of ﬁrms 196,586 189,324 215,286
# of MNCs 0 0 18,700
Mean, Vertical integration index 0.0627 0.0640 0.0640
Median, Vertical integration index 0.0437 0.0439 0.0439
Min, Vertical integration index 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max, Vertical integration index 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333
St. dev., Vertical integration index 0.0633 0.0623 0.0645
Notes: Plant- and ﬁrm-level data from 2004 WorldBase data, Dun & Bradstreet. All samples include ﬁrms ≥ 20
employees in manufacturing sectors. Column (1) is the main sample; columns (2) and (3) are samples used in
robustness checks.
45Table A-6: Tariﬀs and Firm-Level Vertical Integration, Including Multinationals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariﬀk,c 0.0182*** 0.0179*** 0.0179*** 0.0193*** 0.0190*** 0.0189***
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) ) (0.0060) (0.0061)
Employmentf 0.0610*** 0.0610*** 0.0610*** 0.0644*** 0.0644*** 0.0644***
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0061)
Multinationalf -0.0238*** -0.0237*** -0.0239*** -0.0199** -0.0198** -0.0200**
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Capital Intensityk x Financial Developmentc 0.0291* 0.0364*
(0.0149) (0.0193)
Capital Intensityk x Legal Qualityc -0.0977* -0.1180*
(0.0571) (0.0706)
Relation Speciﬁcityk x Legal Qualityc -0.0224 -0.0303
(0.0253) (0.0308)
External Dependencek x Financial Developmentc -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0015)
Herﬁndahlk,c 0.0163 0.0169 0.0160
(0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0226)
# Observations 215,286 215,286 215,286 193,938 193,938 193,938
# Sectors 386 386 386 386 386 386
R2 0.117 0.118 0.117 0.119 0.119 0.119
Sector Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country- Country- Country- Country- Country- Country-
sector sector sector sector sector sector
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signiﬁcance. Dependent variable: log one plus the vertical integration
index of ﬁrm f, with primary sector k, located in country c. The sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employment in the manufacturing sector, including MNCs.
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6Table A-7: Tariﬀs and Firm-Level Vertical Integration, Countries ≥ 1,000 plants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariﬀk,c 0.0214*** 0.0212*** 0.0213*** 0.0228*** 0.0225*** 0.0227***
(0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0062)
Employmentf 0.0439*** 0.0439*** 0.0439*** 0.0449*** 0.0449*** 0.0449***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Capital Intensityk x Financial Developmentc 0.0368** 0.0418**
(0.0174) (0.0213)
Capital Intensityk x Legal Qualityc -0.0998 -0.111
(0.0742) (0.0875)
Relation Speciﬁcityk x Legal Qualityc -0.0210 -0.0232
(0.0379) (0.0441)
External Dependencek x Financial Developmentc 0.0011 0.0005
(0.0016) (0.0019)
Herﬁndahlk,c 0.0089 0.0089 0.0087
(0.0252) (0.0250) (0.0251)
# Observations 189,324 189,324 189,324 174,479 174,479 174,479
# Sectors 386 386 386 386 386 386
R2 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.123 0.123 0.123
Sector Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country- Country- Country- Country- Country- Country-
sector sector sector sector sector sector
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signiﬁcance. Dependent variable: log of one plus the vertical integration
index of ﬁrm f, with primary sector k, located in country c. The sample includes ﬁrms ≥ 20 employment in manufacturing sectors, excluding MNCs, located
in countries with at least 1,000 plants.
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